Abstract: This paper reviews the government role in the legalized gambling sector and addresses some of the major issues relevant to any normative analysis of what the government role should be. In particular, the paper reviews evidence identifying the economic "winners" and "losers" associated with the three largest sectors of the industry: commercial casinos, state lotteries, and Native American casinos. The paper also includes a discussion of the growing internet gambling industry. In addition to reviewing existing literature and evidence, the paper raises relevant questions and policy issues that have not yet been adequately addressed in the economics literature.
INTRODUCTION
In the past three decades, legalized gambling in the United States has grown from a limited activity to one that is extremely commonplace. Gambling in some form is now legal in every state except Hawaii and Utah. Gallup data from 2004 show that two in three Americans report participating in some form of gambling activity in the last 12 months, with state lotteries being the most common. As legalized gambling continues to grow in popularity and prevalence, and new forms of gaming are introduced and expanded, there is much public debate about the costs and benefits of this sector of the economy.
The gambling sector has always been viewed as different from other sectors of the economy. Unlike other industries in which the market is the principal determinant of supply and demand, government decisions have largely determined the size and form of the legalized gambling sector in the United States. For example, in every state that has legalized lottery gambling, the state has declared itself the monopolist provider. In other forms of gambling, federal, state, and local governments determine the kinds of gambling permitted and the number, location, and size of establishments allowed.
One explanation for this view and history of gambling is moral opposition to gambling as a legitimate form of entertainment. Another is concern that unregulated gambling would produce a number of negative effects on society. These include both the negative consequences for gamblers themselves -e.g., financial and family distress caused by problem gambling -and the negative externalities imposed on society, such as increased crime. On the other side of the debate, supporters of legalized gambling recognize the increase in consumer welfare for those who enjoy gambling and participate "responsibly". Casino advocates point to potential economic benefits, including job creation and development. Politicians in favor of expanded gambling operations point to the revenue-generating potential for state and local governments of state lotteries and the taxation of casino revenues.
Gross revenues from legalized gambling reached a record-high $72.9 billion in 2003. More than 80 percent of this total is accounted for by revenues from commercial casinos, Native American casinos, and state lotteries. Each of the gambling industries has a unique history and regulatory structure.
Some policy issues are common to all industries in the sector, while others are unique to the particular form of gambling. This article attempts to identify and discuss from an economics perspective the major "winners" and "losers" associated with the three largest 1 Revenues are only available for a global market. Furthermore, the legality of the industry is not firmly established. 2 Sports betting is legal in only two states: Nevada, through casino sports books, and Oregon, through a state lottery game. The 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC) report estimated that the scope of illegal sports betting in the United States ranges from $80 billion to $380 billion annually, making sports betting the most widespread and popular form of gambling in America.
during the 1980s. These facilities often operated in the midst of considerable legal uncertainty and legal battles with states.
In 1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) which upheld the sovereignty of tribes over their own development, but also recognized limited regulatory rights on the part of states. The IGRA defines three classes of gambling. Class I includes traditional Indian games, over which states have no jurisdiction. Class II games include bingo and is legal as long as "such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity" and may be overseen both by tribes and by the National Indian Gaming Commission. Class III gambling includes all other forms of gambling, including table games and slot machines.
The IGRA specifies that tribes can only offer Class III games when states allow these games elsewhere in the state. So, for example, any tribe in Nevada is eligible to operate a full-scale casino.
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There are active constituent groups on both sides of the casino debate. Proponents cite the obvious "pent up" demand among American adults for casino gambling, noting the spectacular rise in gambling participation that has grown alongside the increased availability of casino facilities. In addition to this increase in consumer utility, proponents note potential economic benefits such as job creation and economic development. The 4 Slot machines in Nevada and NJ accounted for $9.8 million; On the other hand, opponents anticipate "cannabilized" sales from competing business sectors. Opponents also worry about potential social costs, including increased crime and other problem behaviors. 6 To the extent that casinos encourage problem gambling, they might lead to increased rates of bankruptcy, suicide, and family problems.
An additional source of opposition, often voiced by state legislatures, is that the opening of casinos in a state would reduce state lottery revenue.
Impact on surrounding communities
Much of the economic research investigating the ancillary economic benefits of casinos has focused on riverboat casinos. Riverboat casinos are a uniquely American establishment. They began operating in Iowa in 1991 and quickly expanded throughout the Midwest. By 1998, over 40 riverboat casinos were in operation in Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa. Nearly 50 riverboat and dockside casinos were in Louisiana and Mississippi (NGISC, 1999).
There does not appear to be empirical evidence of economic growth as a result of the expansion of riverboat casinos. In terms of generating local tourism, riverboats seem 6 Grinols and Mustard (2004) discuss multiple ways casinos could be expected to alter local crime rates. Casinos might reduce crime directly by improving legal earning opportunities, both through direct wage effects and positive economic development. Conversely, casinos might increase crime by (1) harming economic development by draining the local economy and increasing the incidence of prostitution and illegal gambling-related activities; (2) increasing the payoff to crime by creating opportunities for criminals; (3) increasing the prevalence of problem gambling and thereby increasing the amount of crime generated by gamblers looking to fund their habit; and (4) attracting visitors who are more prone to commit and be victims of crime.
to have been most successful in places such as Galena, Illinois, where the tourism industry was already established. Case studies suggest that the bulk of patrons of riverboat casinos are day-trippers who spend virtually no time at local non-gambling establishments (NGISC, 1999) . There thus appear to be few, if any, positive economic spillovers to the local hotel or restaurant industry. In support of the "cannibalization"
hypothesis, Siegel and Anders (1999) provide empirical evidence that riverboat gambling in Missouri led to a displacement of revenue from industries that constitute substitutes for gaming activity, such as entertainment and recreation services.
Evans and Topoleski (2002) conduct a rigorous examination of the economic and social impacts of Indian casinos for both Indian tribes themselves and surrounding communities. The authors employ a difference-in-difference empirical approach that compares economic outcomes before and after tribes open casinos to outcomes over the same period for tribes that do not adopt or are prohibited from adopted gaming ventures.
Their analysis is based on data for all tribes in the 48 contiguous states for the years 1983, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 Their sample of casinos includes land-based, riverboat, and tribal-owned casinos.
The authors find a sharp increase in most crimes after the introduction of casinos.
Their results suggest that the effect on crime is low shortly after a casino opens, and grows over time. They calculate that roughly eight percent of crime in casino counties in 1996 was attributable to casinos, costing the average adult $75 per year. In addition, they confirm that border counties also experience increased crime rates, which suggests that casinos increase aggregate crime, as opposed to merely shifting crime from one county to another.
Of all the potential social costs of gambling, the link between casinos and crime has received the most research attention. It is very difficult to identify a causal link from casinos to problem and pathological gambling and associated consequences. Grinols and Mustard (2004) for a discussion of weaknesses in the previous literature, which has tended to focus on small samples and isolated case studies and/or has made no attempt to deal with issues of omitted variable bias. 8 Congress created NGISC in 1996 to conduct a comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts of gambling the United States. The research included two national surveys of U.S. adults and youths; a survey of patrons at 21 gambling facilities; case studies in 10 communities; and detailed analyses of a 100-community sample to determine the economic impact of casino gambling. 9 Clinically, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) classifies pathological gambling as an impulse control disorder and describes 10 criteria to guide diagnoses, ranging from "repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling" to committing "illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement to finance gambling." "Problem gamblers" experience a wide range of adverse consequences from their gambling, but fall below the threshold of at least five of the ten APA criteria used to define pathological gambling.
casino availability and the incidence of personal bankruptcies, suicide, divorce, and other costly behaviors is needed.
Impact on Native American tribes
An explicit goal of the IGRA was to promote "tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments." Tribes frequently refer to casinos as the "new buffalo," meaning the new source of economic sustenance for their communities. The tribes point to repaired infrastructure; diversifying economies; rising employment; augmented health, housing, education, and social budgets; greater indigenous language retention; and generally renewed community vitality (Taylor, Krepps, and Wang, 2000) .
Evans and Topoleski (2002) find that four years after tribes open casinos, tribal
population is up by 12 percent and tribal employment has increased by 26 percent, resulting in an increase in tribal employment-to-population ratios of five percentage points (12 percent). In addition, the data suggest a 14 percent reduction in the fraction of adults in the tribe who are working but poor. Furthermore, the data offer no evidence that prior levels or changes in economic conditions determine which tribes adopt gaming.
This latter finding bolsters confidence in a casual interpretation of the estimated effects of a tribal casino on population and employment.
While the empirical evidence suggests that Indian tribes are, on average, clearly "winners" in this venture, the question remains as to whether this is the most efficient policy to improve economic circumstances on reservations. As Evans and Topoleski note, "After 130 years of reservation life, Native Americans on reservations were among the poorest people in this country, so the preceding policies for economic independence were not working. Because the current program seems to be generating jobs does not necessarily mean that granting reservations a monopoly in a particular industry is a desirable policy (p. 49)."
Impact on public revenue
Casino businesses are subject to taxation and therefore have a direct impact on public revenue. Maximum tax rates on gross gaming revenues in American casinos range from 6.25 percent in Nevada to 35 percent in Illinois. Taxes on casinos are not an important source of public sector revenues for most states in the United States; only Nevada is heavily dependent on tax revenue from casino gaming. Non-Indian casinos paid over $2 billion in taxes to states on gaming revenues in 1997, compared to state lottery revenues of approximately $10 billion in the same year (Eadington, 1999, p. 187) .
By law, states cannot tax the profits of tribal businesses. But in some states (e.g., Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, California, and New Mexico), tribes have agreed to make annual payments to state governments. These fees are typically payments for the monopoly rights the state has granted the tribe to provide certain forms gambling. In 2003, tribes contributed over $759 million to state and local governments via various forms of revenue-sharing (Meister, 2004, p.1) . Table 2 lists tribal contributions to state and local governments by state. As shown, there is tremendous variability across states.
The two tribes that operate Mohegan Sun and Foxwoods in Connecticut alone account for over half of these payments.
Casinos might indirectly affect public revenue as well. Insofar as casinos generate additional business income, they might indirectly increase other forms of tax revenue.
Insofar as they cannibilize sales from other businesses, they might decrease net tax revenue. Anders, Siegel, and Yacoub (1998) Though some tribes do pay fees as specified in their compact, there is no standard practice across states.
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And finally, a major issue common across all forms of legalized gambling is the efficiency costs associated with the established market structure. In many states, the nature of agreements between states and Native American tribes grants tribes monopoly power over the provision of casino-style gambling. Any explicit limitation on entry into a market imposes a deadweight economic loss on society. Future research should investigate the consequences of this market structure for consumers. Interestingly, the regressivity of the state lottery appears to vary across lottery products. Low-income lottery players are more likely than other lottery players to bet on instant games. Among NORC survey respondents who report playing the lottery, 38 percent of those in the lowest-income third report that they purchased an instant ticket the last time they played the lottery, compared to 27 and 19 percent of players in the middleand highest-income third. Higher-income players are more likely to have purchased a ticket on a jackpot lotto game -56 percent of those in the highest-income third, 49 percent in the middle group, and 39 percent in the lowest-income third. The NORC survey also asks respondents about their favorite state lottery game. Instant games are the most common reported favorite among those in the lowest-income third, while jackpot lotto games are by far the most common stated favorite among those in the higher income categories.
STATE LOTTERIES
Oster (2004) households that do purchase lottery tickets, the decline in non-gambling expenditures must therefore be considerably greater.
In order to determine whether the shift in household consumption from nongambling expenditures to lottery tickets is consumer-welfare enhancing, we must know whether lottery gamblers are rational, informed consumers, or whether, as some claim, the state is indeed taking advantage of misperceptions and mistakes on the part of consumers. There is evidence that in some ways, consumers, on average, appear to be making sound decisions with regard to lottery purchases, but that in other ways, they are not.
Lottery gambling is part investment, as consumers are making choices over risky assets, and it is part entertainment. Assuming that the entertainment and pecuniary components of the lottery gamble are separable, maximizing behavior predicts that consumer demand for lottery products should depend positively on its expected return, holding constant game characteristics. To evaluate whether this prediction holds, Kearney (forthcoming) analyzes weekly sales and characteristics data from 91 lotto games from 1992 to 1998. The analysis suggests that sales are positively driven by the expected value of a gamble, controlling for higher-order moments of the gamble and non-wealth creating characteristics. This finding is robust to alternative specifications, including controlling for unobserved product fixed effects. The data also reveal that consumers respond to nonwealth creating, "entertaining" game features. Together, these two findings suggest that consumers are at least partly -and potentially fully -informed, rational consumers. It is consistent with these findings to claim that consumers derive an entertainment equal to the price of the gamble (one minus expected value), and then, insofar as they are making investments, they are informed evaluators of gambles.
There is also evidence of mistaken investment decisions on the part of state lottery gamblers. Clotfelter and Cook (1993) and Terrell (1994) -provide evidence of the "gambler's fallacy" among lottery players. The "gambler's fallacy" is the mistaken notion that the second draw of a signal will be negatively correlated with the first draw.
For example, if a slot machine has not won in a while, some gamblers believe it is "due" to win, or vice versa. Using data from the Maryland and New Jersey numbers games respectively, they find that the amount of money bet on a particular number falls sharply after the number is drawn and that it gradually returns to its former level after several months.
Guryan and Kearney (2005) retailers who sell a winning jackpot ticket experience relative increases in ticket sales of the winning game between 12 and 38 percent the following week, and that the sales response increases in the size of the jackpot. The random assignment of winning tickets to stores, conditional on contemporaneous sales, allows this subsequent increase to be interpreted as causally related to the sale of the winner. To the extent that the sales response reflects a belief that the store is "lucky", consumers are exhibiting irrational perceptions of randomness. If lottery consumers misperceive the probability of winning, they are in effect responding to the wrong price, and must forgo other consumption in exchange for the lottery tickets. Furthermore, the authors find that the increase in sales experienced by the winning vendor increases with the proportion of the local population comprised of high school dropouts, elderly adults, and households receiving public assistance. Therefore, if the response does reflect a mistaken notion, economicallydisadvantaged groups appear most likely to espouse it.
The aggregate effect of state lotteries on consumer welfare is ambiguous. For those rational, informed consumers who derive entertainment value from lottery gambling or who benefit from the easy access to gambling, consumer utility is clearly increased. For those who are irrational or misinformed, welfare is potentially harmed. 16 A consideration of the welfare gains or losses associated with winning the lottery is outside the scope of this discussion. Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) conduct an original survey of people playing the lottery in Massachusetts in the mid-1980s to estimate the effect of unearned income on economic behavior. They find that "unearned" lottery prizes reduce labor earnings, with a marginal propensity to consume leisure of approximately 11 percent. They also find that after receiving about half their prize, individuals saved about 16 percent. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that winners of exceptionally large prizes experience personal hardships, including divorce and depression, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no compelling research on this point.
Of the 41 state lotteries, revenue from eleven is contributed entirely to general funds and revenue from 18 is earmarked in total or in part for education. Other uses range from the broad (parks and rec, tax relief, economic development) to the narrow (Mariner's Stadium in Washington and police and fireman pensions in Indiana). Given the fungibility of money, many economists question whether earmarked money actually increases spending on the intended category of expenditures. However, there has been a sizeable public finance literature documenting the so-called "flypaper effect", whereby money "sticks where it hits". Recent work has investigated whether this appears to be true for earmarked lottery revenue.
Evans and Zhang (2002) investigate whether the 16 states that earmark lottery revenues for K-12 education see increases in spending in this category. They conduct three empirical tests. First, they examine states that switched the allocation of lottery profits from the general fund into public education during the sample period of 1978 to 1998. Second, for the nine states that have always earmarked lottery profits for K-12 education, they examine whether period-to-period changes in lottery profits correlate with period-to-period changes in state spending on education, controlling for state and year effects and state-specific time trends. Third, they utilize a two-state least squares approach to estimating the relationship between lottery profits and K-12 spending using the introduction of lotto games and video lotteries as instruments for lottery profits.
The authors find very similar results across the three approaches. A dollar increase in earmarked revenues contributes an additional 60 to 80 cents in K-12 education expenditures. In comparison, in states that deposit funds into the general fund, each dollar of lottery profit increases school spending by 40 to 50 cents; in states that earmark lottery profits for other uses, a dollar of lottery profit increases school spending by only 30 cents. In a contemporaneous paper utilizing a similar methodology, Novarro (2002) also finds that the earmarking of lottery revenue to education does in fact lead to substantial increases in spending on education. She finds that a dollar of lottery profits earmarked for education increases current educational spending by roughly 36 cents more than a non-earmarked dollar and by 60 cents more than a dollar earmarked for other uses.
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Additional issues
First, in addition to the distributional consequences of consumer spending on state lotteries, the distributional consequences of state lottery revenue need to be investigated.
For example, in those states that earmark lottery revenue for education, what demographic groups appear to benefit from any increase in education spending? Stranahan and Borg (2004) investigate the redistributive nature of the lottery-funded merit-based scholarship in Florida. They find that high socioeconomic (SES) households receive a net program benefit while low SES households incur a net program loss. This finding reflects the fact that lower SES households tend to spend more on lottery tickets but are less likely to receive scholarships. More general research on the full distributional consequences of state lottery programs is needed.
Second, the discussion of consumer consequences of state lotteries has focused on the effects for the consumers themselves. An additional concern is whether the individual gambler makes choices that harm those around him, in particular, other members of his household. Traditionally, economists have considered the family or household as a single unit that maximizes a common objective function subject to the family budget constraint.
But recent evidence, in particular from the development economics literature, suggests that the household is a collective, not a unitary, entity and that expenditures depend in part on who controls the household income. If the members of the household do not share a common utility function, any increase in gambling expenditures might come at the expense of the well-being of those not in control of the household finances. More research on the intra-family externalities associated with lottery gambling is needed.
More generally, additional research is needed on associated costly behaviors, including, for example, the incidence of financial distress and bankruptcy.
Third, issues related to market structure should be considered in any normative analysis of the operation of state lotteries. There is also a potential interaction between the regulations imposed on traditional forms of gambling and the growth in internet gambling. As internet gambling is largely provided by offshore companies outside the reach of American gambling regulations, heavier regulations of off-line gaming establishments might encourage people to shift to these gambling outlets. The reverse is also true -increased regulation of internet gambling might increase the revenues of other gambling ventures, or lessen the potential decrease. An additional issue, noted by Hahn and Tetlock (2004) , is that any benefits of regulation ought to be weighed against the cost of discouraging the existence of gambling and information markets with useful economic purposes, such as the Iowa Electronic Markets, which track economic and political events such as elections.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to review the most compelling empirical evidence about the social and economic costs and benefits associated with the three largest industries in the legalized gambling sector -commercial casinos, Native American casinos, and state lotteries. The obvious economic winners are the businesses themselves and the consumers who benefit from consumption of their product. Very little work, if any, has been done to document the increase in consumer utility associated with the increased availability of legalized gambling. Most of the research reviewed here on casino gambling has focused on documenting the impacts of casinos on surrounding communities, the impact of tribal casinos on the affected reservation population, and the impact on net public revenues. The work reviewed on state lotteries has tended to investigate the effect on consumer behavior and public revenue.
Many important economic issues remain to be studied and additional rigorous research is needed. The issue of substitutability across gambling types has been widely addressed in the literature, but is still not entirely understood. There appears to be some evidence of substitution, but recent history suggests that Americans gamble in increasing numbers and increasing sums. How much of an increase in gambling will we experience before reaching an equilibrium level? Is there an optimal level? Issues related to market structure, including the optimal level of regulation, need to be addressed. How much does regulation of one gambling industry drive demand for another? Is regulation an effective tool for encouraging less costly or more beneficial forms of gambling? What are the economic costs associated with the monopoly status granted to states over lotteries and, in many states, to Native American tribes over casinos? The ultimate policy question in the debate over legalized gambling is from a social welfare point of view, to what extent the increase in consumer utility and public revenue offsets the associated social costs.
This piece has attempted to shed some light on this issue and serve as a call for additional work in the area. 
